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Some one hundred years ago, South Africa was torn apart by the Second
Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). To mark this cataclysmic event, Covos-Day is
publishing a series of books. The first is a facsimile of Donald Macdonald's enduring
story of How we kept the flag flying through the siege of Ladysmith I and this is
followed by several other titles including another Ladysmith-siege diary: one written
by George Maidment, a British army orderly.2 Such a publication programme is a
monumental and laudable effort. It allows both reflections upon a calamitous episode
in South African history and, as is the case of How we kept the flag flying, an
opportunity for the collector to acquire old titles, long-out-of-print, at reasonable
prices.
Donald Macdonald was born in Melbourne, Victoria on 6 June 1859. After a
short career as a teacher, he joined the Corowa Free Press and, in 1881, the
Melbourne Argus. A nature writer and cricket commentator,) he arrived in South
Africa on 21 October 1899, the day of the battle at Elandslaagte, as war correspondent
to the Melbourne Argus. This book, How we kept the flag flying, was born from his
experiences and frustrations whilst holed-up in Ladysmith throughout the IDO-day
siege, whilst the war raged and was reported on by journalists elsewhere.
The Second Anglo-Boer War was the last truly colonial war, the last interstate
conflict of the nineteenth-century, the first of the twentieth and the first media war
too. The press, as Thomas Pakenham has so eloquently pointed out, played a cardinal
role in welding the people of the British Empire together and marshalling them behind
the increasingly-unpopular war effort. The position in Australia was no different.
There was, initially at least, no popular support and no popular imperialism. Much
was made of the expressions of sympathy for the Uitlanders, such as that of May
1899 from the Mayor of Sydney, and a "mass meeting of Australians" in
Donald Macdonald, How we kept theflag flying: The story of the siege of Ladysmith (Covos
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A selection of Macdonald's nature writings was published in 1887 as Gum boughs and wallie
bloom. After the war, a,weekly nature column appeared in the Argus, which became "Notes
for Boys" in 1909 and led to the Bush Boy's Book in 1911. This was enlarged in four more
editions between 1927 and 1933. A nature book for children, At the end of the moonpath,
appeared in 1922. He died in November 1932.
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support were "calculated and manufactured." The defeat of British arms during Black
Week increased popular support; while the subsequent Australian operations around
Colesberg were used "to hail the arrival of the Australian soldier." Here the Australian
press, including Macdonald's paper, the Melbourne Argus, played no small part.
5
Yet the love-hate relationship between the military - particularly the censor -
and the war correspondent had still to be ironed, if never quite sorted out.
6 The
problems were multi-faceted: they related to military security and the right to know;
military incompetence and the freedom of the press; intricate military manoeuvre and
ignorance of military affairs. In fact, as far as the war was concerned, Macdonald was
imminently unqualified. He was a nature writer and cricket commentator, and he was
to report on a war that all soon found would not be played by 'the rules'. It was a war
that just wasn't cricket!
Macdonald appreciated his dilemma. South Africa was full of adventure and a
nature lover's paradise but at the same time he would have to report on a phenomenon
of which he knew nothing:
"In this book I have attempted no specialist's description of the siege and
battles of Ladysmith, but have given just the everyday impressions and
sensations of an observer to whom war, with all its thrilling incidents and
vivid volour (sic), was a new and strange experience."?
By his own admission, his knowledge of combat was limited to "the
destruction of the Kelly gang of bushrangers, or a second-hand recital of the revolt of
the Ballarat miners at Eureka.',8 He left the writing of "the complete military history
of Ladysmith ... to the historian and the expert.',9 Setting Amery's Times History
aside, which was initially a commercial venture and in any case sponsored by a
newspaper, the first of these military histories commenced in August 1900 and four
volumes appeared between 1906 and 1910.
10 They, together with the single-volume
Australian official history that appeared in 1911, II were official in every respect. The
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intelligence chief) and then Major General Sir Frederick Maurice; they had privileged
access to classified official documents and to a variety of authoritative persons; and
their products were commissioned and even written from within an official office. 12
Furthermore, highlighting examples of good and bad generalship, good and bad
strategy and tactics, and aimed at instruction for soldiers, they differed little in style
and substance from the dour nineteenth-century products of the German general
staff 13 Here official history and journalism laid down different yet complementary
records of the war: the one utilitarian and often compromised by departmental
interference and goodwill to fellow officers; the other readable and their writers,
despite interference, at least seeking accuracy.
And here the value of How we kept the flag flying lies. Macdonald has
provided a very readable account of one of the most memorable sieges of the century.
He has recorded the events, some tedious some exuberant and exhilarating, in detail
not found elsewhere. His personal account - "not so much a history of the siege as a
story of the siege" - was "written while the events were fresh in the mind." Yet,
judging from the intimate detail, Macdonald must have taken extensive notes during
the siege and isolation of Ladysmith, and these must have been used as the basis for
his 'story'.
Macdonald arrived in South Africa at a time when things were going relatively
well forBritain. His ship was late arriving in Durban due to headwinds and "[t]hose
three lost days made a vast difference to some of US.,,14 He thus "had just missed"
reporting on the battles of Talana and Elandslaagte, which had in any case "been
described in detail bI mahy eye-witnesses, more skilled in war and its detail than an
Australian novice.'"
Macdonald was a man of his time shackled by the contemporary prejudices for
both the Boer and those people generically referred to as 'non-white'. Historians, even
modern historians, have hinted that Australians learned racism and 'absorbed the local
settlers' view' during their sojourn in South Africa during the war.16 Macdonald
described the effects of the Battle of Rietfontein (30 Oct 1899) thus -
"It cleared the town of its human refuse - the mass of Hindoos and unattached
Kaffirs who form such a very large share in the population of Natal, and will
one day, Ihave no doubt, furnish it with its great social and political problem.
The Asiatic was prominent in this railway rush. He carried with him as much
of this world's goods as he could bundle together. He was wildly excited, and
the more congested the crowd the more he chattered, and the faster he ran."
(page 25).
12
13
14
"
16
88
Based upon a definition offered by Robin Higham thirty years ago. See the 'Introduction' to
his Official histories: essays and bibliographies from around the world (Kansas, 1970), p I.
K. Surridge, 'Official History' in C. Wilcox (ed.), Recording the South African War;
Journalism and official history, pp 29-31.
D. Macdonald, How WeKept The Flag Flying, p I.
D. Macdonald, How We'Kept The Flag Flying, p 7.
See for example, C. Wilcox, 'Looking back on the South African War' in P. Dennis and J.
Grey (eds.), The Boer War; Army, Nation. Empire (Canberra, 2000), p 7.
Scientia Militaria - 30(1) 2000
http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.zaAt the time, Macdonald was but a brief nine days in South Africa. It is most
unlikely that convictions underpinning such comments were laid down in such a short
time.
17 More plausibly, such colonials 'imported folk wisdom from the Australian
bush' which did not differ markedly from any other part of the colonised world.IS
While these sentiments are a crude statement of the racial politics in the British
Empire as a whole; the passages in question provide a very vivid picture of the
evacuation of Ladysmith as well as life in the isolatedtown.
The Boers were the focus of the second prejudice. They were backwoodsmen,
far-removed from the coast and the British colonies, whose inland frontiers marked
the furthest penetration of civilisation. The Boer, who according to The Times
"steadily oppose[d) the advance of Europeanc;:ivilization",19 had lapsed into savagery.
Although Macdonald could see similarities"between the Boers and "a camp of
Australian shearers" and acknowledged their "matchless marksmanship", the Boer
was not rated as an opponent:
"From the first their fire work was erratic, and when it came to the artillery
duel there was but one in it. It was not the armament, but the man behind the
gun.1120
This gradually changed, but may have been, initially at least, a repetition of
the unofficial line given the correspondents in the briefing sessions. The
dehurnanisation of the enemy is oft-used propaganda. By Christmas, Macdonald's
sentiment had changed: "...the fact that they had already held so much of this colony
of Natal for two months against an English force, which at one time would have been
thought sufficient to carrythe campaignto'its climax, disposes for all time, I hope, the
foolish impression that the Dutch arenot fightingmen.',2
As Andrew Porter has pointed out, there were two forms of censorship at
work: direct imposition by the milit~ censor and 'indirectly asjournalists developed
their sense of censors' preferences.' 2 Yet the press censor, in Macdonald's case a
Major Altham of the Royal Engineers,was "[t)he guide, philosopher, and perhaps one
may say friend of war correspondents." Despite the censor's absolute mercilessness
with his blue pencil, the correspondents were seldom offended and bore little ill will.
Macdonald seemingly appreciated the need for military security as well as the fact
that most of the time thejournalists misunderstood the military situation. Many others
compromised military security by sending unenciphered despatches through the
gauntlet of the Boer snipers. Although precise military information could not be
given, Altham always "accompanied the crucifixion of a cable despatch with such a
pleasant and pointed fire of running comment that one could never be offended."
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correction of information, chiefly to no avail:23
Correspondent (perhaps Macdonald). - "I shall be very glad, major, if you will
amend them where incorrect."
Censor (Altham). - "No doubt; but then, you see, I'm not acting as
correspondent for your paper."
Thus, due to military security, How we kept thejlagjlying and similar sources
contain little on the planning and execution of military operations, and much of what
was attempted is either wonderfully vague, comprised of half-truths or entirely
incorrect. Macdonald wisely declared his dilemma and generally avoided tactical
comment and operational speculation. There are exceptions. Shortly after his
description of the isolation of Ladysmith, Macdonald explains why "Sir George White
had left such comm'anding positions to the enemy ... ,,24His explanation is correct. Yet
his usage of terminology - occupation in strength, mobility and defensive ring -
seems to suggest a military briefing to correspondents.
Conversely, the despatches and 'stories' of the correspondents, and here
Macdonald is no exception, contain much on the aftermath of contacts. Of medical
matters, both within the town, the convalescent camp and battlefield casualties.
Macdonald's descriptions are vivid. The circumstances of the siege recorded in some
detail, although oftentimes sensational. The siege reflected everything nasty about an
old-fashioned war fought with modem technology. Mangled, shrapnel-tom bodies and
the aftermath of battle, particularly, drew his morbid fascination. And so too the food
rationing, increases in the number of typhoid cases, and the psychological impact of
the artillery barrage: "On the first day: .. people laughed ... On the second day there
was rather less laughter ... On the third day there was an impressive silence ... On the
fourth day men had a hunted look ... Most men were morose.,,25 This was all very
different from the boyish pursuits of nature trails and action on the cricket pitch.
The realities of modem warfare also hampered the work of the journalist.
Macdonald bemoans the "loss in artistic effect." Here "the war artist had to
presuppose, the war correspondent to imagine, much." There were no bright uniforms,
no flags, no inspiring bands to lead the men into battle. No glitter or smoke or
circumstance of any kind that could be observed and reported. In a nutshell, war had
lost its "meretricious glamour" leaving little more than supposition on the part of the
war artist and imagination to the war correspondent.26 At first, "a few rifle shots
would have sent every correspondent to his saddle in anticipation of a fight; now we
paid scarcely any attention to it.,,27
Comment on the Boers and Boer strategy flowed far more readily. This was
not subject to military security, and information was gleaned from Boer prisoners and
the official briefings. The Boers favoured a strategy of siege. It had worked well in the
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Jistract the British commander and the advance up the railway and into the republics
over flat country would, at the very least, be delayed. He could even be defeated in
one of colonies, preferably in the mountainous northern apex of Natal as in 1881,
before entering the republics. One or more of the garrisons might be starved out and
Boer casualties would be limited. The entire strategy revolved around the
minimisation of the impact of the war upon the republican populations. Macdonald
has the essence, gained no doubt from the British military authorities - they were in
possession of the Boer campaign plan as early as June 1899 - and from Boer
prisoners.
Macdonald makes reference to occasional interviews with Boer prisoners.
Information was gleaned on Boer strategy, Smuts' idea of imploding of the Rand
goldmines (on page 40, for example) and much else. Most of these prisoners did not
keep diaries and would not go on to write memoirs. Hence the extra value of How we
kept the flag flying lies in the capturing of information from such interviews that has
not been laid down elsewhere. And here one must point out that the information
drawn out by the military during an interrogation might differ considerably from that
gleaned by the war correspondents in an interview. Unfortunately, Macdonald
describes neither process. Yet, the Boer prisoners seemingly dispensed information
readily.
The 2
nd Anglo-Boer War was undoubtedly a formative episode in the shaping
of Australia and the first of several martial blocks in the building of Australian
nationalism. It was the first war fought 'by Australians, the Commonwealth being
formed in January 1901. In fact, "[w]ith a full appreciation of the patriotism and pride
of race which has made Australasia a fighting unit of the British Empire, [Macdonald]
dedicate[d] this book to [his] fellow-countrymen who took part in the South African
Campaign.,,28 And strange as history would have it, Macdonald, arrived in South
Africa aboard the S.S. Australasian. He referred patronisingly to "the volunteers of
the loyal little colony of Natal.. .",29 minute geographically when drawn into
comparison with Macdonald's new fatherland. Macdonald makes proud and frequent
reference to the great Australian horses and good Australian medical doctors. Yet he
refers to the imperial and colonial troops in South Africa as "an English force,,,3o
while the flag that they 'kept flying', and so prominently displayed on the cover of the
book, was the Union Jack.
How we kept the flag flying is well presented within a sturdy yet attractive set
of covers. It is printed on heavy paper and is stitch bound, and will surely still be in
good condition at the time of the 2nd Anglo-Boer War bicentennial. It is truly 'a
classic in every sense' and possibly the best book published to mark the centennial of
the Anglo-Boer War. It ranks historiographically with Sol Plaatje's Mafeking-siege
diary, which too has seen a centenary edition.31
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